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October 07, 2025
Plaintiffs Beware: Pa. Superior Court Enforces ContractualVenue Clause Over Its Own Procedural Rules
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The Pennsylvania Superior Court in Somerlot v. Jung, 2025 Pa. Super. 166, recently ruled that venue-selection clauses in contracts are more potent than Pennsylvania’s own procedural rules. The court held that when parties freely agree to litigate in a specific venue, that agreement takes precedence over Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1006(c), which would otherwise allow plaintiffs to sue all defendants in any county where venue is proper as to any single defendant. In its decision, the Superior Court supported parties’ efforts to pre-select their preferred venue when negotiating choice-of-venue clauses in contracts, but noted that they should expect their disputes to be resolved in that venue.
Somerlot strengthens the enforceability of forum-selection clauses in contracts with implications beyond the medical consent form at issue in the case. Somerlot is also noteworthy because the court’s decision potentially disadvantaged sympathetic plaintiffs.
The injured patient in the case, Saramari Somerlot, was paralyzed from the chest down after a botched spinal surgery, changing her life and the life of her husband. Despite this, the court determined that Ms. Somerlot’s prior contractual agreement to only sue in Bucks County must be honored even when Pennsylvania’s procedural rules would have given her more advantageous venue options.
The trial court holds Ms. Somerlot to the venue-selection clause she agreed to before surgery
Ms. Somerlot suffered a pinky finger injury in June 2021 after a fall. Bothered by persistent pain and a decreased range of motion, she sought medical treatment from Dr. Soon Jung, a pain management specialist. Dr. Jung’s medical practice was part of S.E. PA Pain Management, Ltd. and Pain Management Centers of America, LLC, with an office in Bucks County. He treated Ms. Somerlot with a series of ketamine infusions at first. Eventually, he recommended she allow him to surgically implant a spinal-cord stimulator device manufactured by Boston Scientific.
Before her October 1, 2021, outpatient surgery, Dr. Jung and Pain Management presented Ms. Somerlot with a standard consent form containing eight numbered paragraphs printed in single-spaced, ten-point font. Paragraph seven contained a venue-selection clause. The clause stated that any legal claims related to the medical services provided by Dr. Jung “shall be brought solely in the Courts of Bucks County, in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.” It also included an opt-out provision with a typographical error referring incorrectly to paragraph seven as paragraph six. Ms. Somerlot signed the agreement without opting out of paragraph seven’s venue-selection clause.
During surgery, serious complications arose, and the botched procedure left Ms. Somerlot paralyzed from the chest down. She also suffered additional severe complications that included vital organ damage, a heart attack, cognitive deficits, loss of fine motor skills, and emotional distress.
Ms. Somerlot and her husband sued for medical malpractice, corporate negligence, product liability, and loss of consortium. Instead of filing the lawsuit in Bucks County, as the venue-selection clause required, they sued Dr. Jung, Pain Management, and Boston Scientific in Philadelphia County because the venue offered the plaintiffs strategic advantages. They claimed Philadelphia County was an appropriate legal venue because, under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1006(c), they were free to sue all defendants wherever venue was proper as to any single defendant, as was the case with Philadelphia County.
When Dr. Jung and Pain Management objected based on paragraph seven’s venue-selection clause, the trial court agreed and issued transfer orders sending the case to Bucks County.
The Superior Court affirms, holding that a plaintiff’s contractual venue selection supersedes procedural rules
Ms. Somerlot and her husband appealed to the Superior Court the trial court’s two separate orders sustaining the preliminary objections of Dr. Jung and Pain Management and transferring the suit to Bucks County. Judge Deborah A. Kunselman, writing for the appellate court, began by noting disapproval of the plaintiffs’ procedural error in filing a single notice of appeal for two separate transfer orders. The court nevertheless found that it had appellate jurisdiction and then offered its reasoning about why the case’s venue must be Bucks County.
First, the Superior Court ruled that Rule 1006(c) does not automatically override contractual venue agreements. The court explained that while the rule creates the possibility of venue in multiple counties for multi-defendant actions, it does not prohibit parties from contractually limiting venue to one proper forum. The Superior Court thus disagreed that the trial court had abused its discretion in finding otherwise. In reaching its conclusion, the court relied on the Pa. Supreme Court’s 1965 decision in Central Contracting Co. v. C.E. Youngdahl & Co., 209 A.2d 810, which established that courts should decline jurisdiction when parties have freely agreed to litigate in another proper venue.
Second, the Superior Court dispensed with arguments that the venue-selection clause improperly bargained away non-contracting defendant Boston Scientific’s rights. The court explained that since Bucks County was a proper venue for the product liability and derivative loss-of-consortium claims, enforcement there created no prejudice to Boston Scientific.
Third, the Superior Court systematically rejected each of Ms. Somerlot and her husband’s challenges to the clause’s enforceability. The court found the venue-selection clause was not ambiguous despite a typographical error in the opt-out provision, noting that the main clause clearly stated that legal claims “shall be brought solely in the Courts of Bucks County.” The court emphasized that the clause would be enforceable even without an opt-out provision, and also observed that Ms. Somerlot had been free to initial the opt-out provision, cross out the venue-selection clause, or decline the surgery, but she did none of these.
Fourth, the Superior Court disagreed that the venue-selection clause was unreasonable because Pennsylvania changed its procedural rules to expand where plaintiffs can bring medical malpractice suits. The court held that, regardless of this rule change, paragraph seven was reasonable under the Central Contracting standard, which deems venue-selection clauses unreasonable only if enforcement would “seriously impair plaintiff’s ability to pursue [her] cause of action.” The court found Bucks County both available and capable of providing substantial justice, noting, ironically, that the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County in Doylestown was a mere two-mile drive from the plaintiffs’ home—far more convenient than the 30-mile drive to the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas in Philadelphia City Hall.
Finally, the Superior Court rejected arguments that the clause was unconscionable. Under Pennsylvania’s two-prong test requiring both procedural and substantive unconscionability, the court found Ms. Somerlot had a meaningful choice when she signed the medical consent form, reiterating that she could have simply crossed out the clause, made a counteroffer, or declined the surgery entirely. The court also noted that the plaintiffs had presented no facts showing the clause unreasonably disfavored them.
Based on all of this, the Superior Court concluded that the trial court correctly transferred the venue of the Somerlot plaintiffs’ case to Bucks County under paragraph seven of the medical consent form.
A warning to plaintiffs: Courts will enforce venue-selection clauses
Somerlot serves as a reminder to plaintiffs and their attorneys that Pennsylvania courts will take a hard line on contractual venue-selection clauses rather than honoring a plaintiff’s strategic litigation preferences. This is true even in cases involving devastating injuries most likely to evoke judicial compassion. Plaintiffs who sign documents containing venue-selection clauses should expect to litigate where they agreed to litigate, not where they later decide would be a more advantageous venue.
The decision also clarifies that creative legal arguments attempting to circumvent venue-selection clauses face an uphill battle. The Somerlot plaintiffs tried multiple approaches: arguing that Rule 1006(c) superseded contract law, asserting that third-party rights had been circumvented by the agreement, claiming the clause was ambiguous because of typographical errors, contending the clause was unreasonable, and asserting unconscionability. The Superior Court disagreed on all points, signaling that future challenges to properly drafted venue-selection clauses will likely fail absent extraordinary circumstances.
Of particular note to plaintiffs’ attorneys, Somerlot demonstrates that courts will not excuse contractual obligations simply because Pennsylvania’s procedural rules have evolved to become more plaintiff-friendly. The Somerlot plaintiffs argued that the venue-selection clause became unreasonable when the Pa. Supreme Court expanded medical malpractice venue options after Ms. Somerlot had signed her consent form. The Superior Court firmly rejected this argument, emphasizing that reasonableness is evaluated based on circumstances existing “at the time of litigation,” not in light of changes in law that occur between contract formation and filing suit.
Somerlot’s message to plaintiffs and the plaintiffs’ bar is clear: Plaintiffs should carefully review all documents they sign before medical procedures, business transactions, or service agreements. If those documents contain venue-selection clauses that disadvantage them or their litigation strategy, the options for challenging those clauses are limited. The time to address venue concerns is before a would-be plaintiff signs on the dotted line, not after a cause of action arises and they and their attorney discover that the doors to the most favorable courthouse are likely closed to them.
Frank N. Ciprero is a partner at Pond Lehocky Giordano Inc., the largest workers’ compensation and disability law firm in Pennsylvania, and one of the largest in the United States. He can be reached at fciprero@pondlehocky.com.
Reprinted with permission from the September 25, 2025 edition of The Legal Intelligencer © 2025 ALM Media Properties, LLC. All rights reserved. Further duplication without permission is prohibited, contact 877-257-3382 or reprints@alm.com.
